Now a day's most of the organizations are moving from wireconnected LAN to wireless LAN. The popularity of the 802.11 network standards stems from the fact that they provide for wireless connections with simplicity and convenience. But, there are many security issues which have been identified in the operation of 802.11 networks, and the 802.11i protocol has been announced to protect these types of networks. 802.11i protocol security has with a focus on an active attack and a passive attack. These types of attacks exhaust the client's memory using a vulnerability of the key derivation procedure in 802.11i. It is vulnerable to various active and passive attacks which include de-authentication and disassociation attacks. For active and passive attacks( denial of services and memory exhaustion ) which are possible in 4-way handshake, this paper provides a secret key distribution with confidentiality and authentication and can also say that this procedure of secret key distribution is free from these active and passive attacks in comparison to original protocol and is more secure.
INTRODUCTION
The increased demands for mobility and flexibility in daily life are demands that lead the development from wired LANs to wireless LANs (WLANs). Today a wired LAN can offer users high bit rates to meet the requirements of bandwidth consuming services like video conferences, streaming video etc. With this in mind a user of a WLAN will have high demands on the system and will not accept too much degradation in performance to achieve mobility and flexibility. This will in turn put high demands on the design of WLANs of the future. Security is main concern for many networks and for wireless network it is very important because wireless medium is open for public access within certain range. Only authenticated users and computers can access this network to solve any type of WLAN issues related to security and take care of two-way authentication between the communicating entities, method of dynamically allocating the encryption keys, use some kind of centralized Authentication mechanism, enhanced encryption algorithms and efficient key management techniques . Various services being offered by any security mechanism includes:
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [1] protocol (WEP) was implemented into the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless LAN communications in the late 1990s. It only took a few months for the first research papers on WEP's poor implementation of the RC4 encryption key stream to surface in the scientific community. Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir (FMS) were the first to submit that by collecting enough data packets from a wireless communication protected by WEP, a computer could calculate, with high statistical accuracy, the secret encryption key and thus break the encrypted cipher text. [15] . However, WEP was an early attempt to secure wireless networks, and better security is now available such as DES, VPN, and WPA [2] . WEP is not difficult to crack, and using it reduces performance slightly. . In order to remove these vulnerabilities a technique called WPA(Wi-Fi Protected Access) [3] was developed. It was deprecated in 2004 and is documented in the current standard. It is an interim solution that is used now until 802.11i comes out. It still using RC4, but the Key was changed to TKIP.TKIP basically works by generating a sequence of WEP keys based on a master key, and re-keying periodically before enough volume of information could be captured to allow recovery of the WEP key. The IEEE 802.11i amendment introduces a range of new security features that are designed to overcome the shortcomings of WEP. It introduces the concept of a Robust Security Network (RSN) [4] , which is defined as a wireless security network that allows the creation of Robust Security Network Associations (RSNA) only which acts as a key management scheme in IEEE 802.11i framework and validates that Pairwise Master Key (PMK) has been established. It further helps in the synchronization of temporal keys which are installed for the process of authentication and encryption being carried out in 802.11i Framework that overcomes the WEP and WPA flaws.
In this paper , mainly concentrate on 2 types of attacks they are: active attacks and passive attacks (i.e. denial of services and memory exhaustion)which are present in 4-way handshake mechanism which makes IEEE802.11i amendment vulnerable to attacks and thus making the encryption and authentication process more secure This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overview of IEEE 802.11i framework, various confidentiality and integrity protocols being used and the potential threats arising from them. Section 3 modified, enhanced and proposes authentication mechanism for key management. Section 4 conclusion and future work.
IEEE802.11I SECURITY ANALYSIS
To analyze the various types of active and passive vulnerabilities, it is mandatory to GIVE BRIEF overview of IEEE802.11i amendment which is then followed by 4-Way Handshake and possible DENIAL of services and memory exhaustion.
Overview of IEEE802.11i Standard
IEEE 802.11i [5] there are many data encryption algorithms defined by IEEE 802.11i [5] :
1-CCMP is the long-term solution requiring additional hardware capabilities 2-TKIP is the short-term solution to fix WEP problems 3-WEP is included for backward compatibility.
This paper is mainly focused on the protocols authentication and do not investigate these data confidentiality protocols in any detail. The basic elements of 802.1X authentication framework are as follows:
Access Point which serves as Authenticator  Authentication Server(RADIUS) [10] RSNA [6, 7] establishment use mainly 802.1x authentication protocols followed by protocols for key management. Like any other authentication procedure, firstly a shared key is generated between the client and the authenticator, then this key subsequent temporal keys are generated which is then followed by distribution of usable keys by the key managements protocols for the particular communication Mainly focus here on 4-Way Handshake [9] procedure and various types of Dos Attacks against it.
Four-Way Handshake
In figure2 there are 4 types of messages that are exchanged between the communicating entities i.e. Supplicant and the AP [11, 12] . First step is the procedure begin by sending of Message1 from AP to Supplicant. Here AP generates ANonce which is a random number, starts a Sequence Number and encapsulates these inside Message1. The Supplicant after receiving message1 generates other random value SNonce, MAC address of the supplicant that is SPA and derives a fresh temporal key Public Transient Key (PTK) which is a function of both SNonce and ANonce and stores both ANonce and SNonce in the memory. Than supplicant generates other message, Message2 which consist of SNonce, Sequence Number, SPA and MIC value which is a function of all other fields and is generated using calculated PTK as the key [7, 13] . Now MIC is calculated in order to preserve the integrity of the send message as other fields are sent as plain text. On receiving Message2, AP generates PTK using the same method and verifies received MIC with the calculated one in order to guarantee its integrity [13] . Now it will constructs Message3 as shown in Figure2 which is like an acknowledgement of message2 which is verified at supplicant side in order to confirm that correct PTK has been generated at other end, Message4 is again the acknowledgement for message 3 by the supplicant. 
DoS and Memory Exhaustion Attacks on 4-Way Handshake
The mechanism defined by IEEE 802.11i is vulnerable to memory exhaustion attacks [11] , [13] , [14] and DoS flooding.
To handle these types of attacks, need to develop some security mechanisms. The main weakness of 4-way handshake of 802.11i standard is the first message because of not using any MIC field in order to guarantee the message integrity. That's why it can be easily eavesdrop by any hacker since it is broadcasted and all fields of it can easily be known to the hacker. As, supplicant side will have both of the random values SNonce and ANonce as stored and new key PTK is derived from function of these random values.
Then Message 2 is generated and MIC field is calculated using this PTK as secret shared key to preserve the integrity of the message and is attached with the message. On the other side PTK is again calculated with the help of same procedure and MIC is calculated and verified [7] . After sending of Message2 attacker can plays its role and constructs a fake message Message1' which differs in ANonce field value only as it is random value generated by AP and sends it to the supplicant .Suppose the fake nonce value be ANonce'. 
Related Work
According to Mitchell [11] , if, add MIC in Message1 then we can easily prevent possible DoS attack because the 4-Way Handshake phase begins both Authenticator and Supplicant shares a common secret key PMK. As we know that PMK is used for adding the MIC value and it is the basic and mandatory element in deriving the series of other keys, so using of it directly in communicating any of the messages over the network is risky and should be avoided as it becomes vulnerable to attacks.
Second method given by him, were of reusing the SNonce value, that is, as supplicant receives Message1 it will generate and store the value of SNonce, it will not store ANonce and the calculated PTK. Now in case S receives Message1' , in that case S should not update its SNonce value till it will receives message 3 which is verified and then PTK is installed. That's why S will store single SNonce value and recalculate PTK whenever it receives Message3, this method will solves the problem of memory exhaustion but in case Message3 is flooded than, have to re-calculate the value of PTK again and again but this will again lead to CPU exhaustion attack.
Xiaodong Zha and Maode Ma [7] presented an enhanced 2-Way handshake protocol, according to which AP will generate 2 random numbers ANonce and BNonce, and encrypt these numbers and supplicant MAC address with PMK. AP then encapsulate this inside Message1 and sends it to the supplicant. Supplicant after receiving Message1 decrypts it with PMK and calculates PTK as stated in standard protocol. After this it encrypts the BNonce and generated SNonce with same PMK and encapsulates this inside Message2 and sends it to AP. After receiving Message2, AP again decrypts it with PMK and verifies BNonce value and once verified calculates PTK with the help of same method. It prevents DoS attacks since ANonce value is encrypted but it increases computation power and it is vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks since PMK is used directly for providing confidentiality services.
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Here, public key encryption schemes instead of secret key PMK. As discussed above that the 4-Way Handshake phase begins both Authenticator and Supplicant shares a common secret key PMK and it is used for adding the MIC value which is basic and mandatory element in deriving the series of other keys, so using of it directly in communicating any of the messages over the network is risky and should be avoided as it becomes vulnerable to attacks.
Public key encryption schemes are secure only if the authenticity of the public key is assured. A simple public key algorithm is Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This protocol enables two users to establish a secret key using a public key scheme based on discrete logarithms. The protocol is secure only if the authenticity of the two participants can be established. One of the major roles of public key encryption has been address the problem of key distribution. There are actually two distinct aspects to the use of public key cryptography in this regard: 
CONCLUSION
IEEE 802.11i standard was defined in order to overcome the vulnerabilities in WEP and WPA but still it is not secure against active and passive attacks (DoS attacks and memory exhaustion attacks) in 4-Way Handshake phase. So here Proposed Secret Key Distribution with Confidentiality and Authentication algorithm which provides us secure key distribution over the wireless network. It will work against the active and passive attacks like Denial of Services and Memory Exhaustion. The most vulnerable part of 4-Way handshake phase is message1 which is the first step in this procedure, because this message is send unencrypted over the network. Secret Key distribution procedure will resolves this problem by encrypting ANonce values and by introducing pair of keys that is public key and private key. If Data is encrypted by public key then data should be decrypted by private key. However this solution becomes little complex due to calculation of one more key and using encryption, but it succeeds in providing security against DoS and DoS flooding attacks. This algorithm is also safe for memory exhaustion attacks because ANonce is never stored at the supplicant side since it can be decrypted only by the supplicant. And after ever session these pair's of keys is change to provide security. That's why is procedure is safe from any type of attacks.
